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Abstract 
The focal narrative in the literature on government and politics in Africa is sheathed 
with the credence that the region has been governed by tyrants, despotic regimes 
and political intrigues, abetting political transitions in belligerent awareness as a 
result. This paper attempts to make a significant departure from this account by 
interrogating the emerging political orders that deconstruct this primordial discourse 
on the African socio-political landscape. It argues that the locus of political transition 
has shifted from a long established political culture to a more mature democratic 
orientation. It demonstrates that some African nations have evolved from political 
pettiness to political adolescence. It concludes that the recent political transitions 
that took place in some African nations represent a different type of regime change 
that marks a momentous departure from the unwavering political culture previously 
present in Africa. 
Introduction 
Following the fall of the Berlin wall, many African nations underwent profound 
regime change. Indeed, some of these regimes were not without subversive political 
transitions - civil war, social unrest, civil protest and citizens’ confrontation with 
the martial regimes that consequentially delineate African political taxonomy. It 
is on this basis that Africa was characteristically categorized on the global political 
map as a region mired in “armed conflict, insecurity, human right atrocities and 
environmental dystopia”1 and expressed elsewhere as “soft, weak, swollen, rentier, 
illogical, underdeveloped, oppressive, powerless and so on – epithets that speak 
to the inability of these states to fulfill basic functions attributable to the modern 
state in political philosophy such as law and order, welfare, territorial sovereignty 
and totality of jurisdiction”.2 Nonetheless, to understand Africa in its empathetic 
nomenclature, dexterity in its languages and cultures become indispensable as 
no western scholarship could claim to have a cure-all explanation to Africa’s socio-
political dilemma. 
During the Cold War, many African leaders were in search of ways to legitimatize 
their political regimes through patrimonial crazes of governance. These efforts were 
supported by external resources and western powers, rather than leaders seeking 
legitimacy through representative democracy or other modes of governance. 
The end of the Cold War era made such political discretion more harangued, and 
this forced African leaders to search for alternative means of foreign support. The 
difficult environment posed in sustaining patrimonial or dictatorial regimes without 
substantial external support somewhat articulates the wave of democratization that 
cropped up in African political terrains in the late 1980s and early 1990s.3 By the end 
of the Cold War, most African states were being ruled by a hodgepodge of single-
party, military and narcissistic big-man regimes. In 1989, only three countries south 
of the Sahara practiced electoral democracies: Gambia, Botswana and Mauritius 
– constituting less than 3.5% of the African population when combined together. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union swiftly enlarged the scope of governance 
reform in Africa. The superpower contenders had formerly discouraged western 
powers from relating or connecting ‘bilateral, government-to-government aid to 
democratization’. International organizations, like the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), ensured that allocation of funds was based on conditional 
‘apolitical’ nomenclature - institutional and policy reforms. Donors like the US 
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instituted ‘political conditionality’ with their aid. African states in search of external 
assistance, therefore, were required to host open and conventionally democratic 
governance structures.4
African nations accommodated the new political liberation in different forms, driving 
them towards more pluralistic political structures. The acknowledgment of popular 
democracy increased in 1989, especially during the notable bicentennial of the French 
Revolution held in July of that year. Within the subsequent twelve months, no less 
than twenty-one African nations had absorbed and adopted a political portico that 
would serve as a democratic façade. This epoch brought noticeable change in the 
political lives of everyday Africans. Notably, earlier in February 1989, the atmosphere 
for popular democracy had stretched to Algeria where the constitutional referendum 
was ratified, certifying civil liberties and the right to form political parties. Following 
this, a similar trend was seen during the signing of the African Charter for Popular 
Participation in Development and Transformation held in Arusha and the release 
of Nelson Mandela from prison by the South African Government in 1990. A similar 
occurrence was observed in the Republic of Benin, where General Kerekou was 
compelled to conduct a National Conference; this was prompted by the threat issued 
by the labour union to go on strike. Benin’s National Conference yielded positive 
results; the congregation suspended the national constitution and dissolved the 
National Assembly. This event led to the appointment of former World Bank official, 
Nicephore Soglo, as the country’s new Prime Minister. The incident channeled the 
reconfiguration of multi-partyism, which later set Nicephore Soglo as President 
following the competitive election between Nicephore Soglo and Mathieu Kerekou.5 
The significance of the democratization project which was achieved through the 
National Conference in the Republic of Benin served as a model and was extended 
to other African states.6 Consequently, this episode was eulogized in the media and 
helped to raise political awareness and to arouse the political consciousness of the 
African citizenry. 
The aggregation of these trends reshaped the nomenclature of regional politics 
and served as a riding board for regime change in Africa.7 The regime changes from 
authoritarian regimes to multi-party democracies, underscored by the liberalization 
of political contestation through a people-oriented constitution, served as a political 
barometer for leadership succession, thus driving the region towards the pursuit for 
democratization. This then served as a socio-economic impetus for combating poverty 
and underdevelopment as well as a platform for the citizenry to enjoy basic political 
rights and accountable governance. Between 1990 and 1993, a larger percentage of 
African states have succumbed to domestic and international pressures to conduct 
presidential or legislative elections. The consequence of such electoral competition 
has been spotty; it had led to regime change and state fragility in some, while others 
have experienced fraudulent electoral conducts, election riggings and socio-political 
disorders that inflamed the vulnerability already present in their region.8 Thus, the 
quest for democratization and peaceful political transition was challenged by a 
pervasive belief among leadership to hold on to power for life. The epidemiological 
political transitions experienced in many African nations that journeyed through 
unsettled political loggia resulted in military takeovers, interim governments or 
pseudo-democratic leadership. The cases of Oman Bongo of Gabon, Lansana Conté 
of Guinea, Félix Houphouët Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire and Gnasssingbé Eyadéma of 
Togo symbolized the rhetoric of tumultuous political transitions in the regional 
landscape of Africa.9
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On various occasions, paternal political transitions from father to son took place 
so that power could continue to revolve around the political dynasty of one leader. 
Such dynastic politics have been identified in the case of Gabon, where the death of 
President Oman Bongo certified the transfer of power to his son. The political event 
that restored Faure Gnassingbé, the son of President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, was 
the latter’s demise in the Republic of Togo, which enabled the former to establish a 
claim to power. Similar occurrences were observed in Guinea when Moussa Camara 
seized power following the death of President Lansana Conté. As Lewis (1996) 
further asserts, the challenges of peaceful political transition have degenerated 
into political catastrophes in Rwanda and state collapse in Somalia, Liberia and 
Burundi, thereby ensuing political decay, insecurity, economic stagnation and the 
search for alternative governments and political environments capable of promoting 
democratic principles in the region.10 
Following the defeat of former authoritarian regimes, a weak commitment to 
democratic canons was demonstrated by African political leaders, in order to 
perpetuate themselves in office long beyond legitimate terms. This rebranded 
the nations towards authoritarianism.11 “Some elected leaders have demonstrated 
perverse ingenuity in finding ways to bend constitutional democratic tenets so as 
to remain in power beyond ordained term limits and to restrict and sharply limit the 
activities of civil society organizations that have been instrumental in the continent’s 
democratic progress”12. African countries have been awestruck with ‘Big-man’ 
syndrome in which the president is considered as being above the constitution. 
One African scholar, Kenneth Kalu, explains it as “in most cases, the typical African 
big man is not subject to the same rules that guide every other citizen”.13
Such practices make it nearly impossible for the ordinary African citizen to hold the 
‘Big Men’ accountable for unlawful activities, thus promoting a culture of impunity 
among the political elite. Nevertheless, the political transitions in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa exemplified a new wave in African political culture, where traditional 
political culture was usually associated with violence, excessive use of force, bloodshed 
and killings of innocent citizenry during regime change. Here, political culture 
demands a “pattern of orientation to political action” 14 that is culturally entrenched 
in communal, national and regional inclinations, including customs and symbols 
validated by local understandings of concepts such as representation, power and 
authority. These common understandings are available and accessible to both the 
ordinary citizens and political elites.15 
This paper’s analysis, therefore, shall be guided by this working definition and will 
attempt to provide insight into the contemporary political culture and recent political 
transitions in Africa. Using meta-analysis, this paper drew largely from secondary 
sources such as books, journals and publications with relevant information on the 
discourse. It explores research from the pool of studies on political transitions across 
countries in Africa, thereby categorizing them into both honorable and dishonorable 
exits. Data gathered was analysed using content analysis and the argument in this 
paper proceeds in five dimensions. The next section addresses politics and political 
culture. After that follows the examination of political transitions in Africa, followed by 
an account of the culture of term limits. The next section examines various political 
regimes that followed ‘honorable’ and ‘dishonorable’ departures. Following this 
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section is the account of regimes that successfully or unsuccessfully manipulated 
their national constitutions for tenure elongation as well as those who have not 
experienced such incidents. The succeeding section provides an argument on the 
dynamics of political transition and changing political culture in Africa. The final 
section is the concluding phase of this paper.  
Politics and Political Culture in Africa 
There was a strong allusion to politics in Africa prior to 1960, when most African 
countries won independence from colonial rule. While it might not be denoted as a 
debatable concept within the African traditional discourse, the operationalization of 
politics is reflected across all spheres of indigenous ways of life, structure and social 
activities on the continent. The inadequate debate, therefore, renders a somewhat 
obscure understanding of politics in Africa. The conceptual discourse on African 
politics began in 1960 when Almond and Verba (1963) opened up a debate on the 
politics of developing countries, and this behavioral revolution led to the re-thinking 
and evaluating of African politics. Another contemporary view was also that of David 
Easton (1957),  who emphasized politics as the authoritative allocation of societal 
values. Subsequently, the study of African politics has progressed in an exceptionally 
slow pace with regards to reflecting trajectories and dynamics. 
Politics in Africa is as diverse as the continent itself. Relative traits can not be attributed 
across all constituent nation-states of Africa. A good reason for this, one might 
argue, is that the explanation of African politics was very normative. There was no 
considerable level of interest on comprehensive and empirically-driven research on 
African politics, thereby slowing the advancement of theoretical propositions on the 
subject matter. This indicates why the context of African politics is still fraught with 
cleavages, as the segregated elements provide inherent lessons to be (un) learned, 
even by democracies, on political concession and stratification for nation-building.
Irrespective of the context ascribed to African politics, what is ideal in a divergent 
political space such as Africa, is, according to Rotberg (1999), reciprocal trust created 
mostly by a combination of formal and informal institutional efforts geared towards 
the achievement of common goods, social capital and effective governance. The 
benefits are abounding if these structured politics are ensued. At the periphery, it will 
facilitate the formation of genuine civil societies with clear interests and feasible end 
results. Subject matter knowledge of African politics was never given due prominence: 
a major reason for this being that interests were not directed towards theoretical 
and empirical engagements on the subject matter. However, African politics has 
been widely symbolized by concepts of identity politics and ethnic politics. These 
conceptual frameworks were able to sail through the available discourse, owing 
to the cultural reactiveness of the people towards these components of African 
politics. Elections are, most often, characterized by highly pronounced rigging, 
wanton killings and socio-ethnic sentiments as well as electoral malpractices as 
noticed in many African countries during the early years after independence. The 
failure of early democratic concretization led to the insurgence of military regimes 
within the political landscape of Africa. This trend transcends across many Africa 
states, with the exception of a few countries with long-standing imperialism and 
non-reactionary measures to political dysfunctionality. 
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Theoretical factors may moderately explain the framework of Africa politics. In this 
regard, systems analysis or structural-functionalism are considerable epistemological 
foundations. Scholars have contended these theoretical approaches in an attempt 
to provide discursive templates and to place the African context into its proper 
perspective, upon which Africa’s politics can be better prescribed and explained. A 
cross-section of these theoretical appraisals maintains that the informational nature 
of African politics appears to be only systemic. It assumes an understanding of 
politics across the globe, leaving a particular gap in African political institutions and 
political systems. In furtherance, the study of political culture is a complementary 
discourse with which the understanding of African politics can be well evaluated. 
Every insightful detail about politics in Africa maintains this position. Formisano 
(2001: 405) argued that “political culture is a dominant explanatory and descriptive 
theme”.17 This contention is not without critique from historians who claim that 
political culture slights the issue of hegemony and power.18 Yet, this concept can 
not be assertively underpinned as it is of colloquial use, as observed from Pye’s 
(1968) definition that “the mere term ‘political culture’ is capable of evoking quick 
intuitive understanding, so that people often feel that, without further and explicit 
definition, they can appreciate its meaning and freely use it”.19
Nevertheless, the ulterior motive of this discourse is to situate the concept within 
the political arena and cross-examine its influence on the trends of politics in Africa. 
While it had been acclaimed that the antecedent of political culture appeared vague 
at its conceptual inception, Almond and Verba (1963), however, annotated that to 
every political action is an embedded pattern of political orientation. It is the typology 
of political orientation that is most often used to describe political culture. Simply 
put, politics in Africa can not deviate from its people’s orientations. The inscriptions 
on African politics are clearly being dotted by the political culture of the people. In 
subsequent analysis, there are key sociological features that were earlier rejected but 
later acknowledged as intrinsic factors of political culture. This includes, according 
to Almond and Verba (1963), attitudes to politics, national character, political values 
and cultural ethos. Of course, these factors are not only essential; but constitute the 
explanatory variables themselves.
An upswing in these debate was noticeable in the 1950s and 1960s.  Culture was given 
a dual efficacy; which is, what can be a causal factor to other events and what can be 
caused by inherent factors in a given society. Berkhofer (1994) thus drew assumptions 
on political culture as “a matter of underlying systems about patterns of ideas and 
value”. The conceptual discourse on political culture gained more momentum owing 
to its possibility in evaluating attitudinal and behavioral differences among nations, 
thereby leading to classifications such as ‘parochial’ and ‘civic’ cultures.20 The former 
represents relatively low individual and group attitudes towards the political system 
of their societies, while the latter is a representation of higher and informed attitudes 
and behaviors towards the political configurations of a state.
To this end, political dynamics are a function of the political culture of individuals and 
groups in a given environment. Thus, what politics entails, in Africa, is a reference 
point to its political culture. A good picture of African politics can be taken with the 
lens of the political culture of said society. This explains why politics, in respective 
African states, has been cloned in varying degrees to the prevalent group and ethnic 
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attitudes. For instance, women do not easily partake in political races in Northern 
Africa, as a result of domineering Islamic beliefs and attitudes. This patriarchal 
attribute represents, according to Nadine (2006), one of the more prominent cultural 
factors that have a lingering effect on the politics of the region and one that has 
somewhat minimized the level of women’s political participation.
While this could be denoted on a regional scale, the diverse trend still does not 
completely hold as respective countries within the same region still exhibit different 
political behaviors and attitudes. As political culture is different from one state to 
another, so is the politics. This brings about the argument on state political culture – 
which examines the variations among states in government activities, administrative 
goals, innovative capacity, popular participation in elections and party competition. 
State political cultures could also be important determinants of differing rates of 
political representation in public institutions. These variations are still borne out 
of the same lineage of cultural, attitudinal and societal diversities. This, to a large 
extent, substantiates the premise that political culture is a harbinger of politics in 
Africa. These concepts are, according to Pye (1968), common terms among social 
scientists. Of course, they appear elusive and reminiscent of other many concepts 
within social sciences. However, due to concerted interrogations via epistemological 
and methodological approaches, these concepts are much clearer now than before. 
Furthermore, this debate continued to late I990s, when scholars working with the 
concept were either searching for a causal middle ground on which political culture 
could serve as an intermediate variable (lobbying for an “interactive” relationship 
between culture and political structure) or rejecting this approach altogether in 
favour of a position that emphasized the primacy of institutions, political actors, or 
individuals’ rational choice. Scholars were also turning to the increasingly influential 
perspectives of anthropology, interpretivism and symbolic analysis. The underlying 
assertion here is that political culture is the source of political preferences across 
nations in Africa. 
Undying Presidencies: Term Limits and Constitutional Manipulation 
in Africa
In the first decade following decolonization, African political leaders were described 
as ‘Big Men’ – unrestricted by the formal rules that emphasized term limits. In 
this political epoch, leaders derived their authority from a permutation of military 
might, informal networks and intimidation. Leaders were appointed and withdrawn 
principally through the barrel of the gun. In this period, it was absurd for a political 
leader to relinquish power based on a constitutional clause. The plausibility of ignoring 
constitutional term limits allowed them to declare themselves ‘President for Life’ 
or to maneuver the legislature to make such pronouncements. Idi Amin in 1976 
employed similar tactics, Kwame Nkrumah did in 1964 and Francisco Macías Nguema 
Jean-Bédel Bokassa did in 1972. Many other African political leaders adopted the 
same advancements in order to lengthen their tenures.21 The trend of lengthening 
presidential terms beyond the legal boundary was followed by Namibia in 1998, when 
its national constitution was amended to provide the opportunity for Sam Nujoma 
to rule for a third term.22 Other attempted manipulations of national constitutions 
took place during the political reign of Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Paul Kigame of Rwanda, Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi, Teodoro Obiang 
of Equatorial Guinea, José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Paul Biya of Cameroon 
and Oman Bongo of Gabon. The attempted constitutional amendment to lift term 
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limit championed by President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso in October 2014 
triggered civil protest. This illustrates how African political regimes have utilized 
constitutional change to continue and perpetuate themselves in positions of power.23
The President of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, and the South Sudanese President, 
Salva Kiir, were elected through constitutional curvatures, while similar anomalies 
were found in 2016 under President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, who was re-elected 
following the completion of his constitutional tenure in 2016 and the removal of 
legal code, allowing him to govern for a fifth term.24 Seven African leaders have 
triumphantly amended their national constitutions so that tenure elongation could 
be accomplished. These include Idriss Deby of Chad, Omar Bongo of Gabon, Lansana 
Conte of Guinea, Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, Sam Nujoma of Namibia, Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo. It should be recalled that 
these leaders have been in power before the adoption of term limits in the 1990s. Their 
inability to adhere to constitutional tenures was highlighted when they refused to 
step down following the end of their legal term limits. For instance, President Oman 
Bongo of Gabon rebuffed the principles enshrined in constitutional term limits, as 
he became president in 1967 under a one-party system and then in 1991 under a 
multi-party system where two-term limits were introduced. After the completion of 
his two terms, he championed a constitutional amendment that put an end to term 
limits. Correspondingly, Lansana Conte, the President of Guinea, employed a similar 
tactic in 2003 through a referendum that purged presidential term limits from the 
Guinean constitution. In the case of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore abolished term 
limits, which were later reinstated. However, a constitutional Court of Justice held 
that the reinstatement could only be employed in future elections and therefore 
could not be applied to his previous political tenures.
Despite the rampage of constitutional reforms, there are countries where this tactic 
has proved unsuccessful. In the Nigerian case during the political regime of President 
Olusegun Obasanjo, Obasanjo attempted to lure the National Assembly to abolish 
existing term limits, following his completion of a two-term constitutional tenure 
and his intention to embark on a third one. It was alledged that a large number 
of parliamentarians were bribed so that the needed two-third majority in the 
hallowed chamber could have passed the bill for assent. However, the bill suffered a 
setback as a result of the lack of consensual armistice among the parliamentarians. 
Following a similar pattern, in Zambia, term limits were stipulated in the national 
constitution and legal framework of the ruling party - the Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD). President Fredrick Chiluba’s pursuit for extension of political 
tenure witnessed severe retardation within his party and from outside the political 
arena – including from the side of civil society organizations, women’s organizations, 
trade unions, religious organizations, senior politicians and legal practitioners. Strong 
condemnation by the general public was showcased when citizens mobilized for 
civil protest against the constitutional reform. While Fredrick Chiluba successfully 
achieved constitutional amendment of the party’s protocols, the public resistance 
against the national constitution, however, forced him to stand down. Moreover, 
he did not relinquish power; instead he managed to outsource the seat of power 
to a loyal presidential candidate that he could easily maneuver. Levy Mwanawasa 
was handpicked as the MMD presidential candidate whose electoral victory in due 
course cut the ribbon of patriotic ties with Fredrick Chiluba. During the political 
administration of Levy Mwanawasa, political immunity for Chiluba was repealed 
which allowed the government to prosecute Chiluba for corruption charges. 
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Many constitutional reform campaigners in Africa have presented their arguments 
in several variations. They often underscore the necessity to sustain reforms as well as 
to manage the fear of instability (Vencovsky, 2008). Nevertheless, resistance to term 
limitation emphasizes the personalistic agenda of incumbent regimes, including 
fear of being prosecuted as a result of human rights abuses or corruption, fear of 
disconnecting with the patrimonial network, desire for continual power and the 
absence of future opportunities for erstwhile presidents. Conversely, the protagonists 
of term limits consider it as an approach to ease ethnic tension in the various regions 
of the continent. For instance, in Nigeria, term limits are identified as an alternative 
solution to ethnic political domination. It is important to observe that in an environment 
where divergent ethnic groups flourish, the feeling of marginalization, alienation 
and craving for power by an individual ethnic stratum can not be ignored. It has 
been suggested that power rotations among numerous ethnic groups from the 
various geo-political zones are capable of smothering burgeoning ethnic tensions 
and feelings of being marginalized. Thus, the term limit is capable of preventing 
habitual and lifelong presidencies in any given country. Moreover, the rationale for 
the implementation of term limits is the belief that the power of incumbency may 
garner more votes during an election, and thus, bestows the upper advantage to 
the political regime in power. Term limits consequently provide the prospect for 
democratic accountability and peaceful power transitions.
Term Limits: Attempted, Failed and No Attempt 
In Malawi, President Bakili Muluzi took a objectionable step on constitutional reform 
to promote his third term agenda. The bill, sponsored by Muluzi, was whitewashed 
in the Parliament. Following this futile effort, two other bills were put forward to the 
Parliament. This triggered a wide range of popular uprisings, protests and criticisms 
from traditional rulers, churches, civil society groups, media, political parties, lawyers 
and the general public. After the two unsuccessful attempt, Muluzi trekked the path 
over to Zambia by nominating an obedient successor as the presidential candidate 
for the next election.  However, while Bingu wa Mutharika was nominated as the 
replacement, subsequent to his inauguration as President of Malawi, the beneficial 
relationship between the political godfather – Muluzi - and the new president - Bingu 
wa Mutharika - experienced fallout due to changes in government policies regarding 
the anti-corruption campaign in the country.25 The implication of incumbent  power 
in such a scenario, as suggested by Cheeseman (2010), is that in an environment 
where the existing president contests an election, he maintains absolute control of 
the state apparatus as well as party structure, or in the case where the incumbent 
president single-handedly nominated his successor, state power may be employed 
in ensuring the political triumph of such candidate.26 This pattern was also seen in 
Togo after the demise of President Gnassingbé Eyadema in 2005. The attempt to 
promote his son, Faure Essozimma Gnassingbé, to the seat of power experienced 
dramatic resistance from the opposition party. The nomination of preferential 
candidates by outgoing presidents is aimed at accentuating the existing rules 
of the political game. A similar occurrence could also be traced to Nigeria during 
President Olusegun Obasanjo’s regime. Following the aborted third-term bid, 
Obasanjo handpicked Umaru Musa Yar’Adua as the sole presidential candidate 
under the political auspices of People’s Democratic Party [PDP]. It is believed that 
the nomination of Yar’Adua was underscored politically, as Yar’Adua was not a strong 
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man in the party and hence needed the support of Obasanjo in determining public 
policy and conducting the selection of candidates for political appointments. In 
line with this assumption, Obasanjo mobilized resources to ensure victory for his 
candidate in a very controversial election.27 Moreover, there are several cases when 
opposition parties have won the elections. The case of Nigeria under President 
Goodluck Jonathan, when he was defeated by Muhammadu Buhari, could be used 
to explain the trepidation of incumbent regimes. Such circumstances give rise 
to probes of the previous activities of past regimes, as Nigeria is now witnessing 
allegations of corruption, bribery, money laundering and diversion of public funds 
by the political cabinet of then President Goodluck Jonathan. Hence, this scenario 
demonstrates that in nearly all African countries, incumbent regimes would prefer 
to maintain the hegemonic power of their political party, so as to escape prosecution 
for any corrupt activities carried out under their reign. 
In a recent work of Posner and Young (2018), the duo posit that “with few exceptions, 
leaders who chose to seek third terms attempted to do so by working through 
constitutional channels rather than around them.” It presents term limits as a potent 
driver towards democracy.28 Term limits are offered as a mechanism through which 
regular elections are conducted, providing a ‘glimmer of hope’ for those in opposition 
to challenge the incumbency of the regime in power, thus fostering democratic 
change – even when there is a sitting president.29 Recognizing the recent shocker 
in Gambia, Nigeria and Ghana, it can be noted that; 
Mahama’s loss in Ghana plus the recent defeats of sitting presidents in Nigeria 
and (despite temporary resistance) the Gambia suggest that incumbents are 
also facing new threats to their holds on power. In particular, recent transfers 
of power have been driven by deteriorating economic conditions, opposition 
learning, more effective and dynamic electoral processes and increasingly 
assertive voters.30
Contrasting the foregoing model present in different African regimes, Tanzanian 
President Jakaya Kikwete is one of a few distinctive African leaders who abide by 
constitutional term limits. After the completion of two-terms, Kikwete voluntarily 
stepped down from political leadership of the country. Unlike him, his Burundian 
counterpart President Pierre Nkurunziza initiated his third-term agenda which later 
degenerated into violence, and in Burkina Faso, President Blaise Compaore was forced 
out of power after advancing his third-term political tenure. The cause for a myriad 
of tenure elongations on the continent is considered to be deficiency in mobilizing 
strong democratic institutions. In place of strong institutions, many African nations 
are building strong Big Men. As Craig (2015) argues “strong men are not going to 
build up strong institutions, strong men are going to build weak institutions in order 
to remain in power”.31 The tables below better articulate numerous African countries 
that have successfully eliminated term limits, the failed attempts and those that have 
not attempted any constitutional amendments regarding term limits. Tables 1-3 
present respectively the countries that have attempted to extend term limits, those 
without any attempts and those that have had unsuccessful attempts in removing 
the constitutional clause for term limits. The tables indicate that between the years 
2000 and 2015, the average Composite Democracy Index (CDI) in countries that have 
successfully removed term limits was 3.6, while countries that have attempted but 
failed scored 5.7 and in countries where no attempt was made at all the CDI was 
7.2. Thus, this demonstrates that the prevailing quality of democracy has a greater 
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impact in determining whether term limits will be sustained, repealed or removed. 
Evidence from the tables considers countries like Senegal where the average CDI is 
7.7, (stronger as compared to other countries). This suggests that public acceptance of 
term limits would be in conformity with levels of democracy. However, the empirical 
study reveals that in countries rated low in CDI, including Swaziland, Guinea, Togo, 
Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, citizens’ acceptance of term limits was reasonably high. 
Equally, in countries rated high in CDI, such as Mauritius, Botswana and Lesotho, 
popular acceptance for term limits was relatively low.32 Generally, in Africa, it can be 
argued that there is growing popular support for term limits. This could be a result 
of the entrenchment of democratic institutions, changing political culture and 
orientation of the African populace. Moreover, the map in Fig. 1 further illustrates 
the experience of African countries regarding term limits.
Term Limits Removed
Country Year CDI*
Cameroon 2008 3.4
Chad 2005 3.1
Congo, Republic of 2015 3.2
Djibouti 2010 4.3
Equitorial Guinea 2011 2.2
Gabon 2003 3.8
Rwanda 2015 3.4
Togo 2002 4.3
Uganda 2005 5.0
Average CDI 3.6
Failed Attempts to Remove Limits
Country Year CDI*
Burkina Faso 2004 4.6
Malawi 2002 7.6
Nigeria 2006 5.6
Zambia 2001 5.0
Average CDI 5.7
Source: 
Reyntjens, 
(2016) The 
Struggle Over 
Term Limits in 
Africa: A New 
Look at the 
Evidence
Source: 
Reyntjens, 
(2016) The 
Struggle Over 
Term Limits in 
Africa: A New 
Look at the 
Evidence
Table 1
Table 2
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Term Limits Removed
Country CDI*
Benin 7.7
Botswana 8.4
Cape Verde 9.2
Comoros 5.3
Ghana 7.9
Guinea-Bissau 5.5
Kenya 6.0
Mali 7.0
Mozambique 6.7
Namibia 7.8
São Tomé and Príncipe 8.9
Senegal 7.6
Seychelles 7.1
Sierra Leone 6.3
South Africa 9.0
Tanzania 5.5
Average CDI 7.2
Source: 
Reyntjens, 
(2016) The 
Struggle Over 
Term Limits in 
Africa: A New 
Look at the 
Evidence
Table 3
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Between ‘Honorable’ Departure and ‘Dishonorable’ Exit 
A variation of regimes has shown different approaches to political transition in Africa. 
Some regimes have taken the path towards constitutional adherence while others 
seek out more manipulative political machinery so that they can afford themselves 
lifelong presidencies. Those that followed honorable pathways employed peaceful 
transition methods and mechanisms at the end of their term limits. Some examples 
include Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Mascarenhas Monteiro of Cape Verde, Joaquim 
Chissano of Mozambique, Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, 
Alpha Konaré of Mali, Nelson Mandela of South Africa, Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, 
Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria and Miguel Trovoada of São Tomé e Príncipe. There 
are a number of cases in which the incumbent regimes were forced out of power, 
while some have trekked the path towards an honorable exit after their tenure. 
Recently, incidences are forcing incumbent political administrations out of power 
in many African states. Remarkably, public sensitivity towards accountable political 
administration and (re)orientation of the citizenry are some newer trends believed to 
be responsible for this contemporary political culture against Africa’s extortionists. 
The case of the former President of Gambia, Yahyah Jammey, represents an example 
of a dishonorable departure. Yahya Jammey was positioned as the ninth longest-
serving president on the Africa continent, having ruled Gambia for 22 years.33 An 
ever grander historic fall for Yahya Jammeh was circumvented in the last presidential 
election face-off between him and Adama Barrow, a property developer. Following 
the declaration, by the national electoral body, of Adama Barrow as the winner of 
the presidential election, Jammeh conceded defeat to Barrow, pledging to work 
alongside him for a peaceful political transition. Following this event, Jammeh 
made a further pronouncement that the election has been annulled as a result of 
‘foreign interference’ and assertively pledged to stay in power until another election 
could be called. However, the United Nations, ECOWAS and the African Union all 
avowed that Jammeh would no longer be recognized as the president of Gambia. 
Source: 
Reyntjens, 
(2016) The 
Struggle Over 
Term Limits in 
Africa: A New 
Look at the 
Evidence
Figure 1.
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A number of high profile delegations, constituting the Presidents of Mauritania, 
Guinea and Liberia, played a key role in mediating with Jammeh for him to relinquish 
power. Nevertheless, the mediatory measure proved unproductive and as such, the 
application of force was considered necessary. ECOWAS had no feasible alternative 
other than to mobilize regional armed forces constituting of 7,000 personnel from 
Nigeria, Ghana, Niger and Senegal, among other nations, to station in Senegal. 
Jammeh, who had initially claimed to rule The Gambia for “one billion years” was 
forced out of power as a result of the joint effort.34
The ironclad Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe also falls within the context of African 
leaders that were forcibly ousted from power. Mugabe has been the only president 
Zimbabweans had experienced since independence. He was a freedom fighter in 
the independence struggle, seen as an icon for the actualization of the Zimbabwe 
nation-state from the hands of the British.  After 37 years of an autocratic reign, the 
popular uprising against his regime sprang as a result of the dismissal of Emmerson 
Mnangagwa - Mugabe’s vice president. Following the sacking of Mnangagwa, 
Mugabe’s intention to install his wife as his successor raised a popular rebellion 
against the government. This marked the beginning of the fall of Mugabe’s political 
administration. This event triggered the urgent convention of a Zimbabwean 
Parliamentary session. The outcome of parliamentary votes threatened Mugabe’s 
presidency, offering him two political alternatives; either to resign or be impeached. It 
should be noted that Mugabe has been the leader of the ZANU-PF party for decades. 
However, the polarization in the party, triggered as a result of Mnangagwa’s removal, 
divided loyalties inside the ZANU-PF party. Following this episode, Robert Mugabe 
was forced out of power by the military, marking the demise of Mugabe’s political 
leadership of Zimbabwe. The factors that produced the dishonorable exit of Robert 
Mugabe unfolded in two dimensions; first, the struggle over who will succeed him 
inside ZANU-PF and second, the divided loyalties between those loyal to former 
vice president Mnangagwa and those supporting Grace Mugabe. The African Union 
recognized that the Zimbabwean people have expressed their wishes that there 
should be a peaceful transfer of power in a manner that secures the democratic 
future of the country. President Mugabe’s decision to resign, paving the way for 
a transition process, was owned and led by the sovereign people of Zimbabwe”.35 
Democratic Transition in Post-Colonial Africa
The character of political transitions varies across borders. The pathways in Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and Southern Europe are inevitably not identical with 
those taken in Africa. Political transitions in divergent environments are shaped by 
cultural and historical traditions. To start with, political transition implies a process of 
transferring power between one regime to another. A successful political transition 
provides a favorable environment for new governments to operate.36 Still, two basic 
approaches to democratic transition have been considered; these include the 
transition from above and transition from below. The transition from above occurs 
when political leaders respond to looming crisis and take corrective measures by 
initiating democratic reforms. In contrast, the transition from below occurs when 
the incumbent political leadership succumbs to popular pressure from the public. 
While confronting it with pact formation, a national conference, a coup d’état or 
popular revolution, it is generically envisaged as a pathway to achieve democratic 
advancement. It has been argued that transitions from above have the capability to 
deliver democracy. This is because such transitions are habitually coordinated within 
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a specific time frame, procedure and strategy. On the contrary, the transition from 
below is often beleaguered with uncertainty, negotiation and the excessive use of 
force on proponents by the government in power.37 Another perspective in the study 
of political transition argues that very few transitions to democratic regimes were 
made possible as a result of revolutionary bursts that surmounted the incumbent 
regimes through popular revolt.38 The trepidation of plummeting the nation into 
crisis emboldened many regimes into dialogue with opposition parties to secure 
political transitions. As Adler and Webster (1995: 82) argues, 
protagonists agree to terminate conflict…because they fear that a continuation 
of conflict may lead to a civil war that will be both collectively and individually 
threatening. The pressure to stabilize the situation is tremendous since 
governance must somehow continue. Chaos is the worst alternative for all.39
Huntington’s (1993) explanation of the ‘third wave’ of democratic transitions in thirty-
five countries provides a myopic relationship between the nature of incumbent 
authoritarian regimes and political transition. He argues that while political transitions 
are often prompted from the top down, such occurrences are by the same token 
probable in personalistic or single-party military regimes. Yet, political leaders in 
one-party states and military regimes are more likely than a personal dictator to 
engage in dialogue with the opposition in the course of transferring power. In fact, 
personalistic regimes are more vulnerable to capitulate when compared to other 
regimes, especially in the process of popular protest. He further argues that dictatorial 
regimes often stay long in power and are obstinate to relinquish power.40
A few prototypes of such regimes are found in the political ecology of Africa. African 
political regimes were incongruent with the movement for democratic multipartyism, 
considering examples from Kenya during the political regime of President Daniel 
Arap Moi, whose political philosophy thwarted political pluralism and disparaged 
the campaigner of multi-party democracy. A similar venture was also made by 
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who sponsored a de jure one-party state 
which was later abandoned as a result of pressure from eminent outspoken citizens 
and donor nations. The protagonists of a one-party system justified the structure 
on a number of grounds, including the traditional supremacy of an ‘unchallenged 
chief’, the recognition of a democratic majority articulated through a single-party 
system and the necessity for unity among divergent ethnic, cultural and linguistic 
groups. Thus, competitive politics was discarded as a foreign luxury neither necessary 
for nor logical in Africa. A similar trend was observed In Malawi, where the rationale 
for a nostalgic single-party system was analyzed based on the quasi-theological 
premise that there is no opposition in Heaven. God himself does not want opposition 
— that is why he chased Satan away. Why should Kamuzu [President Banda] have 
opposition then? 41
Since 1989, several transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes have 
taken place; conversely, many of these constitutionally instituted political regimes 
were short-lived, except in a number of cases where democracy has found to be 
resilient. Even though the trajectory of democratic transition has been defective, 
the acceptance of freedom of expression and recognition of ‘legitimate opposition’ 
are continually reinforced.42 There are critical moments and dynamics in a transitory 
period, and such occurrences habitually compel a dictatorial or military state to 
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dialogue with civil society organizations or concerned citizens. Transitioning into 
a democratic state requires electoral competition and the acceptance of defeat 
by the opposition.43 The acceptance of defeat makes the process of transition less 
troublesome. In Africa, it is well known that fraudulent elections represent one of 
the major challenges subjugating democratic transition; the legitimization of the 
de jure incoming regime becomes difficult due to electoral corruption and the 
inability of the opposition to concede defeat. There were a series of recent protests 
challenging the credibility of elections across Africa. The 1999 elections in Nigeria, 
and subsequent ones, were challenged by local and international election observers 
– the Carter Center, National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican 
Institute (IRI), Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), the European Union as well as the 
opposition.44 More recently, Kenya’s presidential election race, between President 
Uhuru Kenyatta and veteran opposition politician Raila Odinga, triggered protests 
that killed twenty-four persons, showing how the credibility of an election could 
obstruct peaceful political transition.45 Remarkably, in a political environment where 
the opposition acknowledges its defeat, political transition becomes acquiescence 
and therefore enhances democratic stability. It is against this background that 
Bratton (1994: 27),  argues that:
Whether a democratic regime becomes consolidated depends upon the 
acceptance by all political actors, especially the losers of the election, of a 
new and stable set of political rules including the convocation of regular 
subsequent elections. It may take generations to consolidate a democracy. 
Regime consolidation can only be said to have occurred after significant 
threats of regime reversal (e,g, from the military or a “disloyal” opposition) 
have been effectively eliminated or contained.46
In this context, political transitions have continued to change from vicious traditional 
nomenclature to a more peaceful and mature democratic mechanism that has 
come to domicile within the African political environment, therefore, driving the 
continent towards ideal democracy.
From Political Pettiness to Political Adolescence: The Shifting 
Paradigm in African Political Culture
Following the ‘third wave’ of democratization in 1989, African dictators bowed to 
the conventional demands for political reform. The reforms considerably centered 
on term limits, multi-party elections and representative parliaments. The quest for 
institutional reforms recorded significant victories which reduced the host of African 
autocracies from 45 to 30. Nonetheless, since the year 2000, some elected presidents 
have attempted to extend their tenure by the constitutional manipulation that 
brought them to power.47 However, starting from the 1990s, the nature of African 
leadership has slowly began to change; this era witnessed a paradigm shift from 
“coup d’états to voluntary resignations”, moving the region towards ‘institutionalized 
political order’.48 A larger percentage of contemporary African political leaders utilize 
democratic order as compared to their comrades from 25 years ago.49 These changes 
are evident in a series of socio-political metamorphosis. For instance, most African 
countries have political histories that are littered with civil wars, military coups and 
the demise of multi-party systems. This depicts the paltry nature of African politics 
as a result of events that were culturally, attitudinally and behaviorally driven. In an 
attempt to shift from this milieu, Africanisation of the polity began to strive towards 
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the proliferation of political authority figures, as well as organizations and networks 
that serve as interest groups in place of formal governmental institutions. This 
institutional upsurge constitutes the organic part of the African political process. 
Without recourse, organizations and networks have played important roles in the 
relative stability and continuity of democratic governance on the continent. By 1989, 
the winds of political change had signaled throughout Africa. Yet, at this stage, African 
politics was still handicapped by fundamental human rights abuses, economic 
mismanagement, nepotism and political repression. This makes the popular struggle 
for democratic consolidation not outrightly new. Remarkably, the current political 
transition in Africa is taking different forms. It is ensuing from various dimensions 
with different outcomes, depending on the inducement of external bodies as well 
as prevailing socio-political configurations. In this respect, existing studies have 
cautiously identified various typologies of political transition in Africa.
Among the Francophone countries, it can be noted that political powers were 
transited and government structures were formed via national conferences. According 
to Martin (1993), this could, however, be likened to a transitional government with 
a dual executive. It was evident that this type of process had already taken place 
in Benin, Congo, Gabon, Mali and Niger. More notably, a similar process of political 
transition has once manifested to a full military regime in Nigeria, led by General 
Sani Abacha. There are examples of such processes being truncated mid-way, as 
in Togo and Zaire. Transition has also been fully chanted by opposition groups in 
countries like Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic/CAR, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Guinea and Magadascar.50 Furthermore, political transition in some African countries 
have been facilitated via multi-party elections. Initially, no African country (with the 
notable exception of Mauritius) had experienced a change of government via multi-
party elections in the post-independence era. Such government change (without a 
national conference) has since taken place in Senegal (February 1988); Cape Verde 
and Sao Tome & Principe (March 1991); and Zambia (October 1991). Some countries 
had co-opted transitions and these include Cote d’Ivoire (October 1990); Gabon 
(September-October 1990); Ethiopia (June 1992); Cameroon (October 1992); Ghana 
(November 1992); and Kenya (December 1992). It was also the most probable outcome 
in the Central African Republic (1993). In Togo, President Eyadema had managed to 
subvert the transition process by wresting power from the prime minister, Kokou 
Koffigoh, who was democratically elected by the National Conference (July-August 
1991). A similar scenario unfolded in 1993 to the benefit of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire.
Previous descriptions of African political transitions could be declared pettiness while 
political pubescence or adolescence can be considered in the instance of guided 
democratization. This was represented, most notably, by Burkina Faso, Guinea, 
Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, by Ghana and Mauritania, where military regimes 
retained virtually complete control over the transition process making it deliberately 
complex and prolonged. Contrary to this, the relative pettiness of political transition 
was observed via authoritarian action and sub-national conflict. For states in this 
category, the process of political restructuring has been hampered either by the 
stubborn refusal of the incumbent leader to open up the political system (Malawi), 
or by open or latent sub-national conflict (Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Kenya, 
Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia and Tunisia). Moreover, the recent change in 
government in Zimbabwe, South Africa and The Gambia symbolizes how the African 
region is moving towards more mature political transitions. Although The Gambia 
and Zimbabwe experiences might look somewhat forceful, willful resignations are 
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seemingly uncommon in Africa and stand against the long-established tradition of 
African political leadership to hold on to power for life. This thus marks the changing 
political culture of African governance.51 The tables below exemplify the progressive 
pace in democratization acculturation in Africa.
Table 4 illustrates the patterns of polarity and improved democratic constitutionalism 
between Africa and the rest of the world from 1985 to 2014. Table 5, by Freedom 
House, further depicts the declining rate of conflicts in the African region. Beginning 
from the year 1990, the region experienced a drastic reduction in the one-party 
system as well as the diminution in conflict, especially starting from the year 2000. 
This epoch also began to produce the entrenchment of multi-partyism, freedom of 
association and improved freedom of the press. The number of semi-authoritarian, 
hybrid and democratic countries climaxed in 2005. However, some countries have 
experienced improvements with regards to civil liberties and political rights and 
these include countries like Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Liberia, Burkina Faso and Cote 
D’Ivoire while countries like Uganda, Burundi, South Africa, Ethiopia and Gambia 
witnessed a decline. Hybrid regimes were considered neither dictatorial nor fully 
democratized. Yet, some African leaders attempted to stay in power way beyond 
their constitutional limits, seeking constitutional reforms in order to remain in power. 
Table 6 indicates the category of countries that have experienced improvement in 
democratic leadership, especially from the year 2006 to 2015. Surprisingly, the Republic 
of Benin is considered among the most rapid democratizers, while democratic 
regression was marked in eleven countries.  
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
World -1.45 0.70 2.60 3.02 3.71 3.94 4.28
Africa -5.64 -5.02 0.00 0.69 1.88 2.39 2.70
Years Democratic Regimes Hybrid Regimes
Authoriterian 
Regimes
1975 8% 30% 63%
1985 4 28 69
1995 19 39 42
2005 23 44 33
2016 18 41 41
Source: Center for Systemic 
Peace. Harbeson .J. (2018) 
Democracy and the State in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (eds) 
in ‘Africa In World Politics: 
Constructing Political And 
Economic Order
Source: Freedom House, 
www.freedomhouse.
org.  Adapted from Tripp, 
A. (2008) In Pursuit of 
Autonomy: Civil Society 
and the State in Africa, (eds) 
in ‘Africa in world Politics: 
Constructing Political and 
Economic  Order
Table 4 
Democratic 
Progress 
Scores
Table 5
Changes in 
Levels of 
Democratization 
Since 1975 in 
Africa
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Sustained Democracies Most Rapidly Democratizing Countries
2015 
Score
10-Year 
Ave 
Score
Change 
2006-
2015
Cape Verde 90 Cote d’Ivoire 40.0 30
Mauritius 90 Togo 29.2 25
Ghana 83 Zimbabwe 18.5 17
Benin 82 Benin 80.3 12
São Tomé and Príncipe 81 Guinea 46.2 8
South Africa 79 Comoros 54.0 7
Namibia 77 Burkina Faso 52.4 6
Botswana 73
Source: Freedom House, 
www.freedomhouse.org. 
Adapted from Tripp, A. 
(2008) In Pursuit of Autonomy: 
Civil Society and the State 
in Africa, (eds) in ‘Africa in 
World Politics: Constructing 
Political and Economic Order
Table 6  
Democracies 
and Most 
Rapidly 
Democratizing 
Countries in 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 2006–
2015
Conclusion 
Gone are the days when African ‘Big Men’ perpetuated themselves in cycles of 
continued leadership and power. The contemporary African citizenry is becoming 
more politically enlightened and their political orientation has shifted from the 
long-established political culture to more mature democratic evolution. The winds 
of change are raging across the region and so-called ‘third termers’ are fading away. 
Today, at least 75 percent or more of presidential administrations are fused with term 
limits, according to the 2015 Afrobarometer report. While term limits have been 
scrapped in at least nine African countries such as Niger, Chad, Rwanda, Cameroon, 
Togo, Uganda, Guinea, Djibouti and Gabon, some insubordinate political leaders 
have attempted to hold on to power through the instrumentality of constitutional 
manipulation or unconditional disobedience to established term limits. Some of 
these regimes have found it easy to do so, by channeling constitutional manipulation 
through parliamentarians. Once their party holds the majority in parliament, it 
becomes easy to achieve tenure elongation. This political logic has been witnessed 
in a host of African countries, including Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo 
seeking his third term after the completion of two terms. The elongation was later 
blockaded by the upper legislative chamber - National Assembly. In some countries, 
the considerable instrumentality of civil society is also being observed. In Malawi, a 
coalition of civil society organizations had been mobilized against the abolition of 
term limits fronted by President Bakili Muzuli, while similar occurrences witnessed 
resistance from women organizations, opposition parties, church coalitions and 
NGOs against President Frederick Chiluba’s third term agenda in Zambia. The 
overview presented in this paper marked a symbolic departure from articulating 
the dye-hard political leadership model to a more civilized democratic practice in 
Africa. This transition is owing to a myriad of factors, including the changing political 
orientation of the citizenry, media autonomy, effective civil society organizations 
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as well as popular displeasure with the constitutional reform crusaders regarding 
tenure elongation or what some countries refer to as ‘third termer’ political regimes. 
The combination of such metamorphosis leads to advancement that slowly aides 
the political maturity of African states. The current indication in the continent has 
mixed outcomes for tenure elongation and for constitutionally abiding regimes. This 
development has depicted the changing political culture in the region. At the same 
time, it should be understood that while there has been remarkable advancement 
in some countries, there has also been no progress or little advancement in others. 
Thus, it is noteworthy to recognize the fundamentalism of constitutional adherence 
to term limits. The rationale for this can be viewed through dual lenses; first, the mere 
compliance with constitutional term limits by the incumbent regimes could facilitate 
a constructive tradition that can, in a practical sense, advance further change. In 
doing so, it becomes a conventional norm for acceptable political behavior and a 
substantial example for the African political community. Therefore, it is necessary 
to make it difficult for tenure elongation seekers to attempt constitutional reform. 
Second, the international community should recognize the significant contribution 
of civil society in creating momentum against future movement by constitutional 
reformists. Moreover, successes recorded and lessons learnt in other countries that 
have scaled through the hurdles of regime elongation could serve as reference points 
and sources of inspiration for others yet to adopt strict constitutional adherence. 
The experience of a country like Nigeria, that has scaled through the web of such 
political leadership, could offer other African nations encouragement to consider 
conventional the precept of democratic routine on tenure limit, and therefore provide 
a congenial environment for peaceful political transitions on the African continent.
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